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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1980, Minnesota has employed a guidelines-based system 
that delineates presumptive sentences for all felony offenses.1  
Despite the presumptive penalties, judges have statutory authority 
to depart from the guidelines when longer sentences are warranted 
due to substantial and compelling circumstances.2 
The constitutionality of sentencing departures under 
guidelines-based sentencing schemes, now utilized by many states, 
was called into question in 2004 when the U.S. Supreme Court 
reviewed an enhanced sentence out of Washington State in Blakely 
v. Washington.3  The Supreme Court found that the enhanced 
sentence was unconstitutional as violative of the Sixth Amendment 
because a sentencing judge, not a jury, found that the defendant 
acted with particular cruelty.4  Blakely is a landmark case holding 
that any fact, other than the fact of prior conviction, that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the statutorily-defined guidelines 
maximum must be found by a jury, not a sentencing judge.5 
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a controversial 
opinion interpreting the scope of Blakely with respect to durational 
upward sentencing departures in Minnesota.  The court relied on a 
self-created distinction between “facts” and “factors” to issue a rule 
actually prohibiting juries from making final aggravating factor 
determinations for sentencing purposes.6  Effectively, Rourke 
 
 1. See 1978 Minn. Laws 761 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 244 
(2008) (creating sentencing commission and guidelines enabling statute)); 
Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 
(1993) [hereinafter Frase: Future] (describing the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines). 
 2. See MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 2 (2008); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, 28–35 (2010) [hereinafter 
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2010], available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us
/guidelines/guide10.pdf.  The guidelines provide a list of aggravating factors that 
can serve as a basis for departing from presumptive guideline sentencing.  See 
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2010, supra, at 32–34. 
 3. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 4. Id. at 301, 305. 
 5. Id. at 301. 
 6. See State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 921 (Minn. 2009).  In its most simple 
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declared that aggravating sentencing factors are legal—not 
factual—determinations and, therefore, can be decided by a judge.7  
This reasoning, however, appears to “split the hairs” of Blakely in 
order to circumvent submitting aggravating factors for jury 
determination—an outcome arguably not intended by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
This note endeavors to make sense of the Rourke opinion—
how and why the court decided the case the way it did and its 
implications—in light of Blakely.  To that end, this note begins by 
outlining criminal sentencing in Minnesota, the function of 
presumptive sentencing guidelines, and the statutory authority for 
sentencing departures.8  Next the author discusses the landmark 
case Blakely v. Washington, which prohibits states with determinate 
sentencing schemes from imposing enhanced sentences on 
criminal defendants without jury determinations,9 and addresses 
the initial impact of Blakely on Minnesota sentencing procedure.10 
Part III covers the recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision 
State v. Rourke by detailing the procedural history,11 holding, and 
reasoning12 that fostered this controversial opinion.13  In Part IV, 
the author shares some initial reactions to Rourke,14 outlines the 
bifurcated fact-factor sentencing procedure the case commands,15 
and argues that such procedure does not square with Blakely and 
thereby impedes on the jury right in the criminal context.16  
Despite inconsistency between Rourke and Blakely, the author 
nonetheless discusses sound policy interests that the new Rourke 
 
iteration, the court ruled that sentencing-related “facts” are to be found by juries, 
but that the determination as to whether there exists an aggravating “factor” that 
serves as a reason to depart based on those facts rests with the judge.  Id. at 921–
22.  While Rourke does not explicitly prohibit submitting aggravating factors to a 
jury, a subsequent Minnesota case has interpreted Rourke as prohibiting the 
practice of allowing jurors to decide aggravating factors.  See Carse v. State, 778 
N.W.2d 361, 373 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (holding a sentencing procedure in which 
the jury was instructed as to aggravating factors was barred under Rourke). 
 7. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 920. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 11. See infra Part III.A, B. 
 12. See infra Part III.C, D. 
 13. See infra Part III.D. 
 14. See infra Part IV.A. 
 15. See infra Part IV.B. 
 16. See infra Part IV.C. 
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procedure serves.17 
The note concludes that, while Rourke’s fact-factor distinction 
may promote prudential policy interests, the decision ultimately 
flies in the face of precedent by creating an “end run” around 
Blakely.  As such, the fact-factor distinction prescribed in Rourke, 
while perhaps desirable, is impermissible.18 
II. HISTORY 
A. Criminal Sentencing in Minnesota 
1. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
Minnesota has been recognized as a “pioneer” in modern 
sentencing reform.19  In 1978, it became the first state to create a 
sentencing guidelines commission to reform its sentencing 
system.20  The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, implemented in 
1980 and replacing indeterminate sentencing, have been in effect 
longer than any other state and have prompted other states to 
implement reform as well.21  Much of sentencing reform in the 
1980s and beyond was motivated by concerns that indeterminate 
sentencing systems promoted unfairness and disparity in criminal 
sentences.22 
 
 
 
 17. See infra Part IV.D. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The 
Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 279 
(1993) [hereinafter Frase: Lessons] (analyzing whether the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines achieved their stated goals). 
 20. See 1978 Minn. Laws 761–62, 765–67 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. 
§§ 244.01, 244.09 (1980)); Frase: Lessons, supra note 19, at 279 (“Minnesota was the 
first state to use an independent state sentencing commission to draft and 
implement presumptive guidelines, and it was also the first jurisdiction to enact 
state-wide controls over both prison duration and prison commitment decisions.”). 
 21. Frase: Lessons, supra note 19, at 279. 
 22. Under an indeterminate system, judges have immense leeway in choosing 
what sentence they impose.  “[J]udges could impose any sentence from probation 
to the maximum prison term authorized by law.”  Frase: Future, supra note 1, at 7.  
Additionally, under such a system, parole boards were empowered with broad 
discretion in ultimately deciding how much of a sentence each offender will 
actually serve.  Id.  Given the potential for great disparity in sentences, often 
divided along racial lines, many states moved away from indeterminate sentencing 
toward a guideline-driven system.  See id. at 8–9. 
4
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In Minnesota, the guidelines were enacted to “establish 
rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce 
sentencing disparity and ensure the sanctions following conviction 
of a felony are proportional to the severity of the offense of 
conviction and the extent of the offender’s criminal history.”23  To 
this end, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 
created presumptive sentences for each felony based on 
consideration of two factors—the offense severity and the 
offender’s criminal history score24—and devised an easy-to-use 
grid25 to identify the presumptive sentence for any felony.26 
Under this “determinate” system, the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose based on a guilty plea or guilty verdict is the top 
of the presumptive sentencing range found in the grid cell.27  The 
rationale supporting this limitation is that the sentence ranges 
provided in the grid are “presumed to be appropriate for the 
crimes to which they apply.”28 
2. Authority to Depart from the Guidelines’ Presumptive Sentences 
Despite the protective function Minnesota’s guidelines play in 
curbing inconsistent and, thereby, unfair results, a district court 
judge nonetheless has discretion to impose a sentence outside of 
the presumptive sentence range.29  However, the power to do so is 
triggered only if there exists a “substantial and compelling 
circumstance” warranting a longer sentence.30  Departures must be 
 
 23. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 2, at 1. 
 24. Id. § II. 
 25. Id. § IV. 
 26. Id. § II, subdiv. C.  The offenses (and corresponding severity level) are 
charted on the vertical axis of the grid, with the criminal history index along the 
horizontal axis.  See id. § IV.  The grid is also split diagonally along the chart into 
less-severe felonies for which there is a presumptive stayed sentence, and more 
severe crimes for which there is a presumptive commitment to state prison.  Id.  
For each offense and criminal history score combination, a number is given in the 
middle of the corresponding grid cell—this is the presumptive sentence in months 
for the particular offense.  Id.  Just below that is an italicized range of numbers 
that represents a presumptive “range within which a judge may sentence without 
the sentence being deemed a departure.”  Id. at 57. 
 27. See id. § II, subdiv. C cmt. II.C.09.a (discussing the maximum sentence 
rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). 
 28. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 2, at § II, subdiv. D. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id.  See, e.g., State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 140 (Minn. 2005) 
(explaining the district court has power to depart from presumptive sentences only 
if aggravating or mitigating factors are present). 
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based on identifiable aggravating or mitigating factors.31 
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission provides a 
non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating factors that can 
serve as valid reasons for durational departure.32  Some of the 
approved aggravating factors include particular vulnerability (due 
to age, infirmity, or reduced capacity), particular cruelty, a current 
criminal sexual conduct offense, a major economic offense, 
commission of crime in the presence of a child, and commission of 
crime in a location in which the victim expected privacy.33  It 
should be noted that while some of these factors involve rather 
clear-cut inquiries (e.g., whether a child was present), others 
necessitate complex, often non-binary, circumstance-contingent 
determinations, such as particular cruelty and vulnerability.34 
As discussed, the components of Minnesota’s determinate 
sentencing system, like most sentencing reform, sought to limit 
disparity in sentences across offenders of the same or similar crimes 
and to ensure sentences fit the severity of the offense.35  As we have 
seen, however, even under a determinate sentencing scheme like 
Minnesota’s, district court judges still enjoy great latitude in 
deciding whether to depart on the basis of substantial and 
compelling circumstances.36  For over thirty years, this practice went 
largely unquestioned and was the norm in most of the country. 
B. Blakely v. Washington—The “Earthquake” that Shook-up 
Sentencing Departures 
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court called into question the 
constitutionality of these discretionary acts and determinate 
sentencing systems as a whole.37  In Blakely v. Washington,38 the 
Court reviewed a sentencing departure, imposed under 
Washington State’s guidelines scheme.39  Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor famously described this decision as a “Number 10 
 
 31. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 2, at § II, subdiv. D. 
 32. Id. § D.2. 
 33. Id. § D.2.b. 
 34. See infra notes 194–197 and accompanying text for explication of why 
these sentencing determinations are particularly difficult for juries. 
 35. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 36. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 2, § II, subdiv. D. 
 37. See infra Part II.B.3 
 38. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 39. See infra Part II.B.3 
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earthquake.”40   
In this matter, the court held that the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury is violated when facts supporting an exceptional sentence41 
are neither admitted by the defendant nor found by a jury.42  
Because of this decision, “the jury—rather than the judge—
becomes increasingly empowered to determine enhancement facts 
that dramatically increase a defendant’s sentence.”43  To 
understand the import of this decision and its impact upon the role 
of the jury in criminal sentencing enhancements, it is imperative to 
first appreciate the case background, both factually and 
procedurally. 
1. Background 
Ralph and Yolanda Blakely married in 1973.44  In 1995, 
Yolanda filed for divorce, obtained a restraining order against her 
husband, and moved to Spokane, Washington, where the couple 
owned property.45  During the ensuing years, Yolanda initiated trust 
 
 40. Charles Lane, Supreme Court to Consider Federal Sentencing Guidelines, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 3, 2004, at A10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn
/articles/A2962-2004Oct2.html (quoting Justice O’Connor’s unfavorable 
description of Blakely while at a conference with federal judges).  At the time this 
case note was written, there were seventy-two published law review articles that use 
Justice O’Connor’s metaphor when discussing Blakely.  Justice O’Connor has also 
criticized the Apprendi decision, upon which Blakely rests, as an unwarranted 
“watershed change in constitutional law.”  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
524 (2000) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See infra Part II.B.4 for explication of 
Justice O’Connor’s dissenting view that the Apprendi-Blakely line of case law would 
undermine years of modern sentencing reform.  Justice Breyer, also in an 
impassioned dissent, enumerated several ways in which Blakely threatened fairness 
and the “jury trial right the majority purports to strengthen.” See infra Part II.B.4. 
 41. The Blakely Court employs the term “exceptional sentence.”  It refers to a 
sentence that is outside the range provided in determinate statutory or guidelines 
sentencing schemes.  It is synonymous with “departing sentence” and a sentence 
“enhancement.”  The author uses all of these terms interchangeably. 
 42. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (affirming the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey that 
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for 
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt” and citing the right to a jury as a long-
standing principle on which criminal jurisprudence is based). 
 43. Steven G. Kalar et al., A Blakely Primer: An End to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines?, CHAMPION MAG. (Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers (NACDL), 
Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2004, at 10, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf
/698c98dd101a846085256eb400500c01/3a2725450c91fe2785256efb004d4b8f?Op
enDocument&Highlight=0,blakely. 
 44. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298. 
 45. State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
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proceedings against Ralph and moved the couple’s son, Ralphy, to 
Washington to live with her.46 
In 1998, Ralph Blakely attacked his estranged wife as she was 
walking from her mailbox back to the house.47  Ralph bound 
Yolanda’s wrists, covered her mouth with duct tape, and forced her 
at knifepoint into a coffin-like wooden box in the bed of his pick-
up truck.48  He ordered Ralphy, now thirteen, to follow in another 
car and threatened to shoot his mother if Ralphy did not do what 
Ralph instructed.49  Ralphy drove the truck, with Yolanda locked in 
the back, to a friend’s house in Montana.50  The friend managed to 
call the police and Ralph was arrested.51 
2. Procedural History 
Washington State charged Ralph Blakely with first-degree 
kidnapping.52  Subsequently, the state offered to reduce the charge 
to second-degree kidnapping with a deadly weapon enhancement 
and second-degree domestic violence assault.53  In exchange for a 
guilty plea, the state further agreed to recommend a sentence 
within the standard statutory range.54  Ralph Blakely pleaded guilty 
admitting the elements of each of the amended charges, but 
admitted no other facts.55  Pursuant to the plea bargain, the state 
recommended a sentence within the standard range: forty-nine to 
 
 46. Id.  During the course of their marriage, the couple acquired 
considerable real estate and they created a family trust to insulate the properties 
from creditors and tax liability.  Id.  In 1997, Yolanda moved onto one of these 
properties, an orchard home in Grant County, per a divorce court directive.  Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298.  While attacking Yolanda, Ralph told her that he 
wanted her to dismiss the marriage dissolution and trust proceedings against him.  
Id.  Ralph threatened to kill Yolanda and their son if she did not comply with his 
demands.  Id.  He told her he had many knives, guns, and ammunition.  Id.  The 
box in which Yolanda was kidnapped was constructed by Ralph, and was not much 
wider or longer than the victim.  Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 298–99. 
 54. Id. at 300. 
 55. Id. at 299.  That the petitioner only admitted the facts necessary to 
establish each of the charged crimes, and no additional facts, is a critical aspect of 
the Washington State trial that the U.S. Supreme Court deemed problematic.  Id.  
See infra Part II.B.3 for an overview of the Court’s holding and analysis of why this 
was unconstitutional. 
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fifty-three months.56  However, the trial judge did not follow the 
State’s recommendation.57  Instead, he imposed an exceptional 
sentence of ninety months because the offender “acted with 
‘deliberate cruelty,’ a statutorily enumerated ground for departure 
in domestic-violence cases.”58  Blakely appealed the decision to the 
Washington Court of Appeals, arguing that his sentence violated 
the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey59 requiring that the jury find facts 
necessary to support an exceptional sentence.60  The court of 
appeals affirmed.61  The Washington Supreme Court denied 
review.62  Blakely petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari, again arguing that the aggravating factor necessary to 
impose an exceptional sentence had to be found by a jury 
consistent with the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey.63  The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted review. 
 
 56. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300.  The State carefully parsed Washington’s 
sentencing laws to identify the standard presumptive range for Blakely’s crimes.  
See Brief for Respondent at *7–8, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 
02-1632), 2004 WL 199237.  Under Washington law, sentences for multiple 
offenses are served concurrently.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.400(1)(a) (2010).  Of 
all his offenses, Blakely’s kidnapping offense, a “class B felony,” called for the 
longest sentence.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.030(3) (2000).  The statutory 
maximum for a class B felony is ten years imprisonment.  WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.20.021(1)(b) (2010).  However, other provisions of Washington’s Sentencing 
Reform Act further limit sentences based on the seriousness level of the crime and 
the offender’s criminal history score.  Second-degree kidnapping is a level V crime 
and Blakely had a criminal history score of II.  Brief for Respondent, supra, at *7.  
The standard range for a level V crime by a level II offender is thirteen to 
seventeen months.  See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.310, .320, .360 (2000).  With the 
additional, mandatory thirty-six month firearm enhancement, the standard range 
for Blakely’s offense was accurately identified as forty-nine to fifty-three months.  
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. 
 57. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300. 
 58. Id. (citing the Washington Sentencing Reform Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 
9.94A.010 (2000)). 
 59. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 60. State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 157 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).  The Court in 
Apprendi held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 61. Blakely, 47 P.3d at 161.  The court of appeals concluded that Apprendi does 
not apply to factual determinations supporting upward sentencing departures, 
thus holding that facts supporting the sentence did not have to be submitted to a 
jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 159. 
 62. State v. Blakely, 62 P.3d 889 (Wash. 2003). 
 63. Brief for Petitioner at *9, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 
02-1632), 2003 WL 22970606. 
9
Ireland: Case Note: Minnesota's Fact-Factor Bifurcation in Criminal Senten
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] MINNESOTA’S FACT-FACTOR BIFURCATION 1931 
3. The Blakely Majority 
In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began the Court’s 
analysis of the constitutionality of the petitioner’s sentence by 
immediately identifying Apprendi as the controlling rule of law.64  
The Court unequivocally stated “[t]his case requires us to apply the 
rule we expressed in Apprendi . . . : ‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”65 
The Court went on to circumscribe the jurisprudential 
principle implicated in the case: “the ‘truth of every accusation’ 
against a defendant ‘should afterwards be confirmed by the 
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours [sic].’”66  
As amicus curiae in support of the petitioner-Washington State, the 
American Civil Liberties Union arrived at the same conclusion as 
the majority: the “case falls squarely within the rule of Apprendi . . .” 
and accordingly argued the state sidestepped “constitutional 
protections of surpassing importance.”67 
The Court concluded that the trial judge could not have 
validly arrived at a ninety month sentence under Washington’s 
sentencing rules, based solely on the facts admitted in the 
defendant’s guilty plea.68  The Court explained that the statutory 
maximum in this case was not the ten-year ceiling for Class B 
felonies, but fifty-three months.69  Justice Scalia clarified that the 
statutory maximum “for Apprendi purposes” is not the outer limit of 
what the “judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the 
maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”70 
 
 
 64. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 65. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 490). 
 66. Id. (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
343 (1769)).  This principle to which Justice Scalia refers is, of course, the right to 
a jury enshrined in the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  See U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI. 
 67. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support 
of Petitioner at *6–7, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-1632), 
2003 WL 22970599 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476). 
 68. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304.  See also supra note 55 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the petitioner, in his plea, admitted only the facts necessary to 
establish the elements of each of the charged crimes and no additional facts). 
 69. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303–04. 
 70. Id. 
10
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Applying this standard to the Washington sentencing rules, the 
Court differentiated the ten-year limit on imprisonment terms for 
Class B felonies and the fifty-three month maximum sentence the 
judge could impose based on the facts proven in establishing the 
elements of the crime in Blakely’s case.71  Hence, only upon a 
finding of additional facts would the trial judge have had the 
statutorily enumerated power to impose a sentence up to ten 
years.72  Accordingly, the majority found that “[t]he judge in this 
case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-month sentence 
solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea.”73 
This case flatly failed the Apprendi standard because the facts 
necessary to support petitioner’s exceptional sentence were neither 
admitted to by him nor found by a jury.  Thus, the Court held that 
the sentence deprived Ralph Blakely of his Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury and, therefore, was invalid.74 
4. The Blakely Dissents 
Blakely was decided in a sharply divided five-four opinion.75  
Echoing her dissent in Apprendi,76 Justice O’Connor registered 
several criticisms against the Court’s reasoning and predicted grave 
effects flowing from this ruling.77  Chief among her concerns was 
the threat to the modern sentencing reform this ruling posed.78 
 
 
 71. See id. at 304–05 (explaining the statutory maximum, because it is not the 
maximum a judge may ever impose, is only that which can be imposed based solely 
on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant and thus, under 
Washington law, that is fifty-three months). 
 72. See id. at 303 (noting that ten years, under Washington law, is the limit for 
enhanced sentences, and further explaining that enhancements require finding 
facts beyond the verdict or plea). 
 73. Id. at 304. 
 74. Id. at 305. 
 75. Justices O’Connor, Brennan, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist all 
dissented.  All four joined O’Connor’s dissent in part, while Justices Breyer and 
Kennedy issued their own dissents as well. 
 76. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 549–59 (2000) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 77. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 318 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing the 
majority decision as a “substantial constitutional tax” for taking those facts 
historically belonging to the province of sentencing judges and requiring them to 
be included in indictments and explicating why this is an unreasonable burden). 
 78. Id. at 326 (“What I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years 
of sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments 
are in jeopardy.”). 
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Justice Breyer in a separate dissent predicted that the new 
Blakely requirement would likely induce states to supplant 
guidelines systems with either “pure charge” offense systems, 
statutorily mandated sentencing, or the indeterminate sentencing 
they previously left behind.79  In his view, each of these 
consequences “risks either impracticality, unfairness, or harm to 
the jury trial right the majority purports to strengthen.”80 
C. Sentencing Departures in Post-Blakely Minnesota 
After Blakely, there was a rash of activity across the nation 
amongst legislatures, prosecutors, members of the criminal defense 
bar, and criminal justice organizations in an effort to adjust to the 
ruling and to understand the impact it would have on various 
sentencing schemes.81  At the federal level, the Department of 
Justice took preventative measures in anticipation that Blakely 
would eventually be extended to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.82  All federal prosecutors were given new “protective 
procedures” to follow in charging and trial practices.83  The 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, who supported 
 
 79. Id. at 330–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 330. 
 81. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 82. Less than two weeks after Blakely was decided, the Deputy Attorney 
General for the Department of Justice sent a memorandum to all federal 
prosecutors noting that Blakely did not reach the federal guidelines, but 
recognized the specter of such a future ruling.  Memorandum from James Comey, 
Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Federal Prosecutors, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice (July 2, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom
/blakely.htm.  In deciding Blakely, the Court declined to address the 
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.9 
(“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on 
them.”).  However, since any differences between Washington’s state guidelines 
and the Federal Guidelines are arguably constitutionally insignificant, some have 
interpreted Blakely as a serious threat to the Federal ones.  See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. 
at 324–25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Federal Guidelines are 
vulnerable to a constitutional attack on account of the Blakely ruling).  The United 
States, as amicus curiae for Washington State, noted some differences between 
Washington’s sentencing regime and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines but 
questioned whether those differences were of “constitutional magnitude.”  Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *29–30, Blakely 
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-1632), 2004 WL 177025. 
 83. See Memorandum from James Comey, supra note 82 (directing 
prosecutors to include upward departure factors in all indictments and to seek 
waivers to all rights under Blakely when seeking plea agreements). 
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the petitioner as amicus curiae,84 posted numerous articles and 
hosted discussions to promote understanding of this ruling for 
criminal defense attorneys.85 
The Minnesota Legislature also responded to Blakely by 
enacting numerous provisions prescribing procedures for 
aggravating factors in sentencing departures.86  Yet, perhaps the 
most notable change was made to the guidelines themselves by the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission—a change that 
would not have surprised Justices O’Connor and Breyer.  After 
Blakely, Minnesota opened up its presumptive sentence ranges to 
provide a wider range of sentences that a judge could impose 
without having to employ Blakely procedures for a departure.87 
By far the most important Minnesota case grappling with the 
precise requirements of Blakely, and further demarcating the roles 
for both judge and jury in sentencing departure procedure, was 
decided in October 2009 by the Minnesota Supreme Court—State 
v. Rourke.88 
 
 
 84. Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. in 
Support of Petitioner, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-1632), 
2003 WL 22925106. 
 85. See Blakely v. Washington, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
LAWYERS, http://www.nacdl.org/booker (last visited March 3, 2011) (listing 
various resources on Blakely and its progeny including case materials, articles, and 
links to audio recordings on panel discussions). 
 86. 9 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CRIMINAL 
LAW & PROCEDURE § 36.30 (3d ed. 2009).  The changes provide for “unitary and 
bifurcated trials, order of presentation of evidence, waiver of jury trial on 
aggravating facts, and allowing aggravating factors not specified in guidelines 
upon proper notice.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 87. The presumptive range for first-degree assault, for example, for an 
offender with a criminal history score of one was between ninety-three and 103 
months in 2004.  In 2005, after Blakely, the range for the same offense was 
expanded to encompass sentences between eighty-four and 117 months.  Compare 
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
COMMENTARY, § IV (2004), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines
/guide04.DOC, with MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, § IV (2005), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us
/guidelines/guide05.DOC.  The 2005 changes gave judges more latitude in 
choosing sentences without having to employ departure procedures. 
 88. State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 2009). 
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III. THE ROURKE DECISION 
A. Background 
The circumstances prompting the criminal conviction of Chad 
Rourke are similar to those underlying Blakely and, unfortunately, 
all too familiar to many women in this country.89  Appellant Chad 
Rourke and Erica Boettcher had an on-again-off-again relationship 
in which Rourke physically abused Boettcher.90  Despite separating 
in 2003, Rourke and Boettcher continued to live together in 
Morris, Minnesota.91 
On January 28, 2003, Boettcher drove to a friend’s house to 
pick up Rourke.92  Upon getting into the vehicle, “Rourke ordered 
[Boettcher] into the passenger’s seat, took the keys, and drove 
around Morris while threatening to kill her.”93  Rourke was 
speeding and drove into a pole.94  Rourke fled the scene after 
unsuccessfully attempting to move Boettcher to create the 
appearance she was driving.95 
To better understand the sentencing issues at stake in Rourke, 
it is imperative to first revisit the procedural history of the case and 
appreciate how and why the case ended up addressing the issues it 
did. 
 
 
 
 
 
 89. See Domestic Violence Facts, NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf 
(last visited March 3, 2011) (“An estimated 1.3 million women are victims of 
physical assault by an intimate partner each year.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 90. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 915.  The extent of the abuse was noted in great 
detail by the court of appeals in its opinion.  See State v. Rourke, 681 N.W.2d 35, 37 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 91. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 915. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  Rourke was driving approximately sixty miles-per-hour in a thirty mile-
per-hour zone.  Rourke, 681 N.W.2d at 37. 
 95. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 915.  Boettcher’s legs were pinned in the vehicle.  
She shattered bones in her ankle, requiring placement of seventeen screws and a 
metal plate in her leg.  Rourke, 681 N.W.2d at 37. 
14
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B. Procedural History 
Rourke was charged in connection with the car crash96 and he 
pleaded guilty to first-degree assault.97  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement with the state, Rourke admitted to driving Boettcher’s 
vehicle in a reckless manner, that he did so with the intent of 
intimidating her, and that the collision caused her great bodily 
harm.98  Rourke further agreed to a maximum sentence of 128 
months,99 which constituted an upward departure from the 
presumptive ninety-eight month sentence under the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines.100  In return for Rourke’s plea, the state 
dismissed the five other charges and agreed not to seek a sentence 
greater than the 128-month sentence upon which they agreed.101 
Consistent with the parties’ agreement, Rourke was sentenced 
to 128 months,102 an upward departure from the presumptive 
sentence of ninety-eight months for first-degree assault.103  The 
district court relied on four grounds for imposing the longer 
sentence: Rourke’s two prior misdemeanor convictions against 
Boettcher;104 Rourke’s abuse of a position of power; the particular 
cruelty of the offense; and the plea agreement with the state.105 
 
 96. Rourke, 681 N.W.2d at 37.  In its complaint, Stevens County charged 
Rourke with seven crimes: assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, 
assault in the third degree, criminal damage to property in the first degree, 
domestic assault, reckless driving, and careless driving.  Id. 
 97. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 916; Appellant’s Brief at 6, State v. Rourke, 773 
N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 2009) (No. A07-0937), 2007 WL 6942369.  The basis for the 
first degree charge was that Rourke inflicted great bodily harm on the victim.  See 
MINN. STAT. § 609.221, subdiv. 1 (2002) (prohibiting a person from inflicting great 
bodily harm while assaulting another person). 
 98. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 916. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  One hundred twenty-eight months is outside the presumptive range 
prescribed in the guidelines.  The presumptive sentence for first-degree assault for 
Rourke, who had a criminal history score of one, was ninety-eight months.  The 
permissible sentence range a judge could have imposed without it being deemed a 
“departure” was between ninety-three and 103 months.  See MINN. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, § IV (2004), 
available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/guide04.DOC. 
 101. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 916; Rourke, 681 N.W.2d at 37. 
 102. Rourke, 681 N.W.2d at 38. 
 103. See supra note 100 for an explanation of the presumptive sentence for 
first-degree-assault by an offender with a criminal history score of one. 
 104. Rourke was convicted of fifth-degree assault against Boettcher in both 
1999 and 2000.  Rourke, 681 N.W.2d at 37 n.1. 
 105. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 916; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 97, at 8. 
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1. Rourke I: The First Appeal 
In Rourke’s first appeal,106 he challenged the sentencing 
departure.107  The court of appeals concluded that the district court 
properly found a substantial and compelling reason—particular 
cruelty—for imposing the departure.108  Rourke appealed this 
decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court.109  However, while 
Rourke’s appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Blakely v. Washington,110 a decision striking at the heart of the 
departure issues germane to Rourke.  Thus, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and remanded 
the case in light of Blakely.111 
2. Rourke II: The First Remand 
On remand, and in deference to the newly minted Blakely rule, 
the court of appeals concluded that the sentencing departure 
(from the statutory ninety-eight months to 128 months) “violated 
[Rourke’s] right to a jury trial under Blakely” and was, therefore, 
invalid.112  Accordingly, the case was remanded for resentencing 
 
 106. Rourke, 681 N.W.2d 35. 
 107. Id. at 36.  Among other things, Rourke argued that a plea agreement 
cannot serve as the sole basis for a sentencing departure and that the district court 
erred in imposing an upward departure on the basis of “particular cruelty” of the 
offense.  He contended that his actions were “stupid” but not atypical of assaultive 
behavior.  Id. at 38–39. 
 108. Id. at 39.  The court also found that the sentence was justified on the 
grounds that Rourke had abused his “position of power” and that the victim was in 
a “position of particular vulnerability.”  Id. at 40–41. 
 109. See Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 916 (implying the supreme court granted review 
of Rourke). 
 110. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (holding that any fact, 
other than a prior conviction, which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding 
the statutory maximum must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt); see supra Part II.B for explication of this landmark 
case. 
 111. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 916.  Pursuant to Blakely, this meant that any facts 
necessary to support a sentencing departure from the statutory maximum would 
have to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.  
Under Blakely, a sentencing judge no longer had the power to make factual 
determinations as to whether a departure was warranted.  This new requirement 
was deemed necessary by the U.S. Supreme Court to satisfy a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury.  See id. (citing a longstanding tenet of criminal 
jurisprudence: “that the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a defendant ‘should 
afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and 
neighbours [sic].’”). 
 112. State v. Rourke, No. A03-1254, 2005 WL 525522, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
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consistent with the Blakely constitutional requirement—that a jury, 
not a judge, would have to find facts supporting a departure.113 
3. The First “Blakely” Trial 
On the second remand, the district court empanelled a jury 
for a Blakely trial, wherein the court submitted two aggravating 
sentencing factors to the jury114: particular cruelty and vulnerability 
of victim.115  The jury found that Boettcher was treated with 
particular cruelty, but that she had not been particularly vulnerable 
on the day of the assault.116 
The district court entered an order ruling the term “particular 
cruelty” was unconstitutionally vague.  As such, the court had no 
power to provide jury instructions as to that term.117  The court 
sentenced Rourke to 103 months in prison—the top of the 
presumptive sentencing range under the guidelines.118 
 
Mar. 8, 2005). 
 113. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 916. 
 114. The State had requested the court submit two additional aggravating 
sentencing factors: plea agreement and abuse of position of power.  However, 
“[f]ollowing a pre-trial hearing, the district court concluded that only the factors 
of particular cruelty and vulnerability of the victim would be submitted to the jury 
because the sentencing guidelines’ list of aggravating sentencing factors did not 
include plea agreements or abuse of a position of power.”  Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 
916. 
 115. Id.; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 97, at 8–9.  The jury was presented the 
following two interrogatories: “(1) Was [the victim] treated with particular cruelty 
on January 28, 2003? and (2) Was [the victim] particularly vulnerable on January 
28, 2003, due to age, infirmity, reduced physical capacity, or reduced mental 
capacity?”  Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 916.  Although “[t]he district court denied the 
State’s request for a jury instruction defining ‘particular vulnerability’ as including 
repeated attacks and intimidation by Rourke and a level of extreme and escalating 
ongoing violence, threats to kill, and efforts to control and intimidate 
[Boettcher],” the state was permitted to argue to the jury that the victim was 
physically “infirm” by reason of years of abuse inflicted upon her by the offender.  
Id. at 916, 916 n.1. 
 116. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 916–17. 
 117. Id. at 917. 
 118. Id.; see also MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, § IV (2004), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us
/guidelines/guide04.DOC (providing a grid with the presumptive sentence 
lengths).  This sentence is significant.  It was not a departure, because it fell within 
the statutory range prescribed in the guidelines (between ninety-three and 103 
months).  Id.  In deciding the jury could not be instructed as to particular cruelty, 
the court effectively nullified any opportunity before the Blakely jury to find a valid 
basis for an enhanced sentence. 
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4. Rourke III: The Court of Appeals Vacates  
The State appealed this 103-month sentence.119  The court of 
appeals reversed the district court ruling that particular cruelty was 
unconstitutionally vague.120  Accordingly, the case was sent back 
down to the lower court on remand for another Blakely trial in 
which particular cruelty would be defined for the jury consistent 
with State v. Weaver.121  With the prospect of a new Blakely trial, the 
state was given another opportunity to obtain the sentencing 
departure it sought. 
 
 
 
 
 119. State v. Rourke, No. A07-0937, 2008 WL 2105445, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 20, 2008).  The state argued that the district court erred when it: (1) ruled 
that the aggravating factor of “particular cruelty” is unconstitutionally vague; (2) 
refused to submit to the jury the aggravating factor of “abuse of a position of 
power” on the grounds that it is not enumerated in the sentencing guidelines; and 
(3) refused to define the aggravating factor of “particular vulnerability” to include 
vulnerability created by repeated attacks and intimidation, and extreme, 
escalating, and ongoing violence.  Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at *6.  In State v. Weaver, the court defined the standard for particular 
cruelty as conduct “significantly more cruel than that usually associated with the 
offense [for] which [the offender] was convicted.”  733 N.W.2d 793, 803 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2007).  This is the controlling standard.  Yet there has been much 
litigation in Minnesota over what constitutes particular cruelty for the purposes of 
sentencing departures.  Compare Holmes v. State, 437 N.W.2d 58, 59–60 (Minn. 
1989) (departure overturned where conduct not significantly different from that 
typically associated with the crime), and State v. Hanson, 405 N.W.2d 467, 469 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (departure overturned where manslaughter committed in a 
manner not “significantly more serious” than typical manslaughter), with State v. 
Campbell, 367 N.W.2d 454, 460–61 (Minn. 1985) (departure upheld in brutal 
murder of mentally disabled women by seventeen stab wounds and ear-to-ear 
throat splitting where position of trust was used to gain entry to victim’s home), 
State v. Vogelpohl, 326 N.W.2d 635, 636 (Minn. 1982) (departure upheld for 
murder where defendant stuffed victim’s mouth to keep her quiet while he hit her 
head with two hammers at least eight times), State v. Gurske, 424 N.W.2d 300, 305 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (departure upheld where defendant burned victim alive), 
State v. Dircks, 412 N.W.2d 765, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (departure upheld 
where defendant slashed victim’s throat, hit her with baseball bat, and then set fire 
to her while she still may have been alive), State v. Ming Sen Shiue, 326 N.W.2d 
648, 654–55 (Minn. 1982) (departure upheld where defendant concealed the 
victim’s body for reasons of trauma suffered by victim’s family and other policy 
reasons), and State v. Rathbun, 347 N.W.2d 548, 548–49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) 
(departure upheld for particular cruelty in commission of the offense where 
defendant stabbed victim twenty-three times).  Before Blakely, the sentencing judge 
often made these determinations as to whether particular cruelty was used in the 
commission of a crime. 
18
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However, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted Rourke’s 
petition for review.122  At this stage—over five years from Rourke’s 
guilty plea—the case was again going before the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.  The state’s highest court was positioned to make 
sense of the role that particular cruelty is to play in sentencing123 
and to define the precise scope of Blakely trials under Minnesota’s 
system.124 
C. Minnesota Supreme Court—The Majority Decision 
The court first addressed the question of whether the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines’ aggravating factor of particular 
cruelty was unconstitutionally vague, explaining that a statute 
providing judicial discretion in sentence determinations is not 
unconstitutional unless it violates the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.125  The court relied on Minnesota case law, 
State v. Givens,126 and an Eighth Circuit decision, United States v. 
 
 122. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913. 
 123. The court granted the appellant review of two issues: whether the 
aggravating factor of particular cruelty was unconstitutionally vague under the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and whether the state had a right to seek post-
trial appellate review of the Blakely trial determinations at the district court level.  
Id. at 917.  The court also granted the state’s petition for cross-review of a double-
jeopardy issue decided by the court of appeals.  Id.  The author of this case note 
will address only the first of these issues, as it is beyond the scope of this article to 
address the other procedural matters. 
 124. Rourke remains authoritative.  At that time this article was written, the 
decision in Rourke constitutes controlling law on sentencing departures in 
Minnesota, has received no negative treatment by the courts, and has been directly 
applied by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in three cases involving durational 
sentencing departures.  See State v. Ahmed, 782 N.W.2d 253, 256 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2010) (reversed and remanded for sentencing in light of Rourke due to jury having 
been instructed on particular cruelty); Carse v. State, 778 N.W.2d 361, 371–73 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (holding trial court’s instruction to the jury to determine 
whether aggravating factors were present was improper and violated the rule in 
Rourke); State v. Belter, No. A07-1059, 2010 WL 1189774, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Mar. 30, 2010) (remanded because trial court erred in instructing jury to 
determine whether particular vulnerability was established). 
 125. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 918 (citing State v. Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293, 301 
(Minn. 1993)). 
 126. 332 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn. 1983) (explaining that non-capital sentence 
decisions fall outside the purview of Godfrey—the authority for applying vagueness 
principles to sentencing decisions).  See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 
(1980) (explaining how the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is 
triggered when a judge imposes a death sentence under a statute that provides 
“standardless sentencing discretion”). 
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Wivell,127 to prove that “more routine sentencing decisions—those 
not including the death sentence” are not subject to vagueness 
challenges.128 
Appellant argued that Givens and Wivell were not controlling 
because Blakely had since been decided and required any 
aggravating factors that could serve as substantial and compelling 
reasons to depart from a presumptive sentence be submitted to a 
jury.129  The court did not disagree that Blakely was controlling, but 
asserted that Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines were consistent 
with that ruling.130 
The court then detailed the requirements under the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.131  It characterized these rules as 
prescribing “two distinct requirements” for a departure: “(1) a 
factual finding that there exist one or more circumstances not 
reflected in the guilty verdict or guilty plea, and (2) an explanation 
by the district court as to why those circumstances create a 
substantial and compelling reason to impose a sentence outside the 
range on the grid.”132  The court concluded that the secondary 
explanations of why the court is departing from the presumptive 
sentence “do not involve finding facts” and that such “discretionary 
acts . . . are not subject to the rule announced in Blakely.”133 
 
 127. 893 F.2d 156, 160 (8th Cir. 1990) (clarifying that aggravating factors in 
the federal sentencing guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges—they 
cannot violate a defendant’s due process by reason of being vague—because those 
guidelines do not outline illegal conduct but instead provide directives for judges 
to use as guidance). 
 128. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 918. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 919.  At this point, the court’s inquiry into the factor of particular 
cruelty turned into a Blakely analysis.  The central issue, as the court framed it, was 
whether particular cruelty (or any aggravating factor) is a fact requiring jury 
determination per Blakely, or a mere factor which could serve as judge’s “reason” to 
depart from a presumptive sentence.  Id. at 920. 
 131. Id. at 919–20 (quoting MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, § II, subdiv. D. (2009)).  The court 
conceded “that a district court ‘must afford the accused an opportunity to have a 
jury trial on the additional facts that support the departure and to have the facts 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Id.  Yet, if the State manages to reach this 
threshold in proving additional facts, then a district court “may exercise [its] 
discretion to depart from the presumptive sentence.”  Id.  In exercising this 
discretion, the district court must explain on the record what aggravating factors 
compelled the court to depart from the statutory presumptive sentences.  Id. at 
920. 
 132. Id. at 919. 
 133. Id. at 920.  But see infra Part III.D (detailing the dissent’s stark 
disagreement with this reading of both the guidelines and of Blakely). 
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The question hanging in the balance, as understood by the 
majority, was whether the aggravating circumstance of particular 
cruelty is an “additional fact” or a “reason” that can serve as a legal 
reason to depart.134  Under the majority’s interpretation of the 
Guidelines and of Blakely,135 the court further concluded that an 
“additional fact” must be submitted to jurors, but a “‘reason’ which 
explains why the additional facts provide the district court a 
substantial and compelling reason or basis to impose a sentence 
outside the range on the grid” falls “outside the purview of a Blakely 
jury” and within the province of judicial discretion.136 
The court held that the aggravating factor “particular cruelty” 
was a reason, not a fact.137  As such, this “reason” explains why the 
additional facts as found by the jury create the proper basis for 
imposing a sentence that is longer than the usual one.138  In its 
opinion, the court articulated this holding several times, reiterating 
its newly codified fact-reason distinction: aggravating facts are to be 
found by the jury, yet aggravating factors are legal determinations 
for a judge.139 
 
 134. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 920–21. 
 135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text explaining the court’s 
interpretation of the guidelines’ fact-reason distinction and of how “reasons” are 
not subject to Blakely. 
 136. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 920.  This interpretation that “particular cruelty” is 
non-factual is one with which the dissent and the author of this article disagree.  
But see infra Parts III.D, IV. 
 137. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 920. (“[W]e conclude that the particular cruelty 
aggravating factor is a reason that explains why the additional facts found by the 
jury provide the district court a substantial and compelling basis for imposition of 
a sentence outside the range on the grid.”). 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 920–21 (“Blakely . . . does not require us to abandon our view that 
the particular cruelty aggravating factor is a reason explaining why the facts of the 
case provide the district court a substantial and compelling basis for imposition of 
a sentence outside the range on the grid.”); id. at 921 (“We hold that a district 
court must submit to a jury the question . . . of additional facts . . . which support 
reasons for departure.  But the question of whether those additional facts provide 
the district court a reason to depart does not involve a factual determination and, 
therefore, need not be submitted to a jury.” (emphasis added)); id. at 921 n.8 (“To 
be clear, the question of whether the defendant inflicted . . . pain alleged by the 
State is one for the jury.  But the explanation as to why the facts found by the jury 
made the defendant’s offense more serious than that typically involved in the 
commission of the crime . . . is given by the court.” (emphasis added)); id. at 922 
(“Blakely does not require that a jury determine whether a crime was particularly 
cruel.”); id. (“Blakely requires that the jury determine ‘additional facts’ . . . which a 
judge may rely on to support his or her explanation as to why those additional 
facts support a substantial and compelling reason . . . to impose a sentence outside 
the presumptive sentencing range.”). 
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In support of its decision, the court offered two lines of 
reasoning.  First, the court pointed to past cases in which 
aggravating factors were merely cast as reasons for departures.140  
Second, the court pointed to a comment in the Guidelines that 
actually cut against its ruling.141  This comment states that if an 
aggravated departure is considered, “[a] defendant has the right to 
a jury trial to determine whether or not aggravating factors are 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”142  The court “[acknowledged] 
that this comment is inconsistent with [its] holding[,]”143 but 
overcame this roadblock by explaining that the Guidelines are 
“advisory rather than controlling.”144  The court cited no other 
authority to buttress its arguments. 
Ultimately, the court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision 
that particular cruelty was not unconstitutionally vague, but 
reversed the court of appeals’ order to submit the factor to the jury 
with a definition.145  With respect to sentencing, the court left that 
issue in the hands of the lower courts.146 
D. The Dissent 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Paul Anderson147 
unequivocally disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that 
particular cruelty does not involve fact-finding.148  Consequently, he 
 
 140. Id. at 920 (citing State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442, 450 (Minn. 2004); State v. 
Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 485–87 (Minn. 1981)). 
 141. See Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 921 n.9 (citing MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, cmt. II.D.01 (2009)).   
 142. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
AND COMMENTARY, cmt. II.D.01 (2009), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us
/guidelines/guide09.pdf. 
 143. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 921 n.9. 
 144. Id. (citing Asfaha v. State, 665 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Minn. 2003)). 
 145. Id. at 922–23. 
 146. See id. at 923 (instructing that if another Blakely trial were held on 
remand, the district court should submit interrogatories to a Blakely jury inquiring 
only as to whether the state has proven the alleged factual circumstances that 
provide “a substantial and compelling reason . . . to depart from the presumptive 
guideline sentence[,]” but not inquiring as to the ultimate question of whether 
aggravating factors exist). 
 147. Justice Paul H. Anderson is not to be confused with Justice G. Barry 
Anderson, who wrote for the majority.  All references to Justice Anderson in the 
course of this case note refer to the former, Justice Paul Anderson, the sole 
dissenting justice in Rourke. 
 148. See Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 925–27 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (discussing 
post-Blakely changes to sentencing guidelines and pattern jury instructions 
requiring that aggravating sentencing factors be submitted to a jury as facts, and 
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disagreed that particular cruelty need not be submitted to a jury.149 
In stark contrast to the majority, Justice Anderson held that 
Minnesota case law, the state’s sentencing guidelines, and 
Minnesota pattern jury instructions all unambiguously “recognize 
that aggravating factors, including particular cruelty, are facts that 
must be found by a jury.”150  According to the dissent, 
“[f]undamentally, aggravating factors are facts” and Minnesota case 
law supports this understanding.151  The dissent also looked to the 
text of Apprendi and Blakely as unambiguous and dispositive on this 
point.152  Justice Anderson highlighted that “[t]he United States 
Supreme Court has said that ‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”153  The dissent also articulated 
why “particular cruelty” is factual in nature.154 
In sum, the dissent rested on an entirely different 
interpretation of Blakely’s scope, meaning, and requirements with 
respect to whether particular cruelty needs to be found by a jury for 
 
explaining how post-Blakely case law shows the court’s understanding that 
aggravating factors are factual in nature); see, e.g., State v. Thompson, 720 N.W.2d 
820, 827 (Minn. 2006) (explaining that after defendant waived right to jury, the 
district court performed the fact-finding function of jury and found several 
aggravating factors); State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 24 (Minn. 2006) 
(concluding that impaneling a jury was necessary to vindicate defendant of his 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of aggravating sentencing factors); 
State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn. 2005) (stating the use of an offender-
related aggravating factor did not insulate the departure from the Apprendi-Blakely 
rule). 
 149. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 925 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[A] finding of 
particular cruelty exposes the defendant to a sentence exceeding the maximum 
authorized by the jury’s verdict of guilty and therefore must be found by a jury.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 926.  Justice Anderson cited several Minnesota cases wherein the 
court recognized that the Sixth Amendment required that a jury determine 
whether aggravating factors were present for sentencing purposes.  See id. at 925. 
 152. See id. at 927 (citing the requirement of Blakely and Apprendi—that juries 
must decide aggravating sentencing factors—that have subsequently been 
enshrined in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) and United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). 
 153. Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
 154. Id. at 926–27 (explicating that the behavior which comprises particular 
cruelty necessarily “goes beyond what is inherent in the statutory elements of the 
crime at issue” and a factual determination is required).  Justice Anderson 
concluded that this factual inquiry “involves a comparison of defendant’s conduct 
with conduct usually associated with the offense . . . and therefore must be made 
by a jury.”  Id. at 927. 
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states like Minnesota with determinate sentencing schemes.  The 
dissent would have remanded the case for a new Blakely trial.155 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Reacting to Rourke 
Many things may not be clear when wading through the 
numerous decisions and appeals in Rourke.  What is indisputable, 
however, is that the case turns on the interpretation of Blakely—its 
precise contours and reach.156  How the majority arrived at its 
ultimate conclusion—that Blakely does not reach particular cruelty 
as a judicial reason for departing, but only the facts that would 
constitute particular cruelty—is no doubt confusing.  More 
importantly, it is a conclusion likely not warranted by the Apprendi-
Blakely line of cases. 
 At first blush, Rourke appears at odds with the rather bright-
line Blakely standard: juries must determine facts upon which 
culpability and enhanced sentencing are based.  The majority 
seems to center its whole argument on its theoretical, and rather 
abstruse, fact-reason distinction—one that cannot be traced to the 
Blakely opinion itself.157  The Rourke court even concedes 
inconsistency between its holding and the state guidelines.158  In 
sum, Rourke can be viewed as an act of “splitting hairs” to arrive at a 
new rule that was simply a desirable result for the court.159 
Yet some believe the court “got it right” and that Rourke “was a 
long time coming.”160  This sentiment is driven by important 
practical concerns with respect to the capacity of jurors to make 
determinations as to difficult and often vague criminal law 
concepts like the existence of aggravating circumstances, and is less 
concerned with strict adherence to the principle of stare decisis.161 
 
 
 
 155. Id. at 929. 
 156. See supra Part III.C. 
 157. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  The opinion does not 
recognize a distinction between aggravating facts and factors. 
 158. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 159. See infra Part IV.C, D. 
 160. Interview with Bradford Colbert, Appellate Pub. Defender, Office of the 
Minn. State Pub. Defender, in St. Paul, Minn. (Oct. 25, 2010). 
 161. See infra Part IV.D for analysis of some unspoken policy interests Rourke 
serves. 
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In this section, the author first explicates what procedure 
Rourke requires of Minnesota courts for aggravated sentencing 
inquiries.162  The author argues that the Rourke decision effectuates 
a bifurcated fact-factor fiction163 that is inconsistent with the 
longstanding right to a jury in criminal proceedings as understood 
and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Apprendi-Blakely.164  
Notwithstanding the tension between Rourke and the right to a jury, 
the author next recognizes sound policy interests served by the 
Rourke sentencing procedure.165  In conclusion, the author posits 
that, while there may be exigent policy reasons for this new fact-
factor procedure, it defies U.S. Supreme Court case law and our 
tradition of empowering juries to determine criminal culpability.166 
B. Rourke Fact-Factor Procedure for Sentencing Departures 
The Minnesota Supreme Court used Rourke as a vehicle to shift 
certain factual determinations from the province of the jury to the 
judge.167  It ruled that aggravating factors are not factual 
determinations, but rather legal conclusions that may compel a 
judge to impose a sentence outside of the guideline ranges.168  
While the court did not explicitly lay out how district courts were to 
proceed with its directive, subsequent cases upholding Rourke did. 
In Carse v. State,169 decided in February 2010, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals upheld Rourke and fleshed out the bifurcated 
sentencing fact-finding required from its ruling in Rourke.170  Carse 
involved a matter in which the defendant was found guilty of first-
degree assault.171  At his sentencing trial, the district court judge 
instructed the jury to determine whether the victim was 
“particularly vulnerable” and whether the defendant used 
“particular cruelty” in the commission of the assault.172  On petition 
 
 162. See infra Part IV.B. 
 163. See infra Part IV.B. 
 164. See infra Part IV.C. 
 165. See infra Part IV.D. 
 166. See infra Part V. 
 167. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 920 (Minn. 2009) (holding that the aggravating 
factor of particular cruelty is a “reason” explaining why additional facts provided 
the court a basis to depart from the guidelines—not an “additional fact” that had 
to be submitted to the jury). 
 168. See id. 
 169. 778 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 170. Id. at 372–73. 
 171. Id. at 367. 
 172. Id. 
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for post-conviction relief, the court of appeals ruled that the district 
court’s sentencing procedure violated Rourke.173  The court made 
clear that an upward durational departure based upon aggravating 
factors found by the jury was improper, because that is a 
determination entrusted to the judge.174 
The Carse court explained that Minnesota must handle 
sentencing departures “[u]nder the procedure described in Rourke, 
[wherein] a jury should not be asked to determine whether or not 
an enumerated aggravating factor exists—that determination must 
be made by the sentencing judge.”175  The court detailed the 
process that Rourke commands:  
The jury should have been asked to determine the 
existence of the particular facts that the state alleged in 
support of its argument that substantial and compelling 
circumstances justified a departure based on the 
particular-cruelty factor.  After which, the sentencing 
judge should have determined whether a departure was 
warranted based on the facts found by the jury.176 
This procedure splits aggravating factor determinations into a 
two-part inquiry, relying on a fact-factor “fiction.”177  Rourke requires 
the judge to extricate aggravating facts from the aggravating 
circumstance.  The factual constituent parts go to the jury, after 
which the overarching factor determination goes to the judge. 
 
 173. Id. at 372–73 (“Rourke is the law in Minnesota, and [the court is] obligated 
to follow it even though the parties did not cite or argue it on appeal.”). 
 174. Id. at 373.  Note that this is the converse of the Blakely procedural posture 
and holding.  See supra Part II.B.2–3. 
 175. Carse, 778 N.W.2d at 373 (emphasis added).  While this procedure follows 
Rourke, the author argues it is inconsistent with the procedure required by Blakely.  
See infra Part IV.C; see also supra Part II.B (explaining the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
analysis and holding in Blakely that an exceptional sentence violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury when aggravating factors necessary to support the 
sentencing departure are neither admitted by the defendant nor proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 176. Carse, 778 N.W.2d at 373. 
 177. The author describes the Rourke fact-factor distinction as a “fiction” 
primarily because it incorrectly presupposes that aggravating circumstances can 
distill into discreet fact-based component parts, each of which can then be 
subjected to a binary inquiry.  See infra note 196 and accompanying text for 
related discussion.  The fact-factor distinction is furthermore a “fiction” to the 
extent it undermines the right to have juries find each element of the charged 
offenses.  Many criminal law scholars hold that all sentencing factors that can 
increase a penalty are additional “elements” of an offense, and, therefore, must be 
proven to a jury.  See infra notes 184–186 and accompanying text. 
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C. Why the Fact-Factor Fiction Impedes on the Jury Right 
As in Carse, Rourke directs juries to decide only sentencing 
“facts,” while it commands judges to determine sentencing “factors” 
that could comprise a reason to impose an enhanced sentence.178  
One is left wondering whether, and to what extent, placing 
aggravating factor determinations in the province of the judge 
impedes on the jury right. 
The right to a criminal jury trial is a deep-rooted principle in 
American jurisprudence, enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.179  
This right provides what one commentator describes as a “critical 
check on state power” fundamental to the U.S. operation of 
government.180  The jury right prohibits the court from substituting 
itself for the jury without consent of the parties.181 
Chiefly, this right requires juries to find the elements of a 
charged crime and to determine guilt.182  Dividing up this inquiry 
into two parts—where juries find facts but judges find elements—
violates this long-standing principle.  For example, in a culpable 
negligence manslaughter case, the jury must find whether the 
defendant acted with culpable negligence.  A judge cannot decide 
this question.  It would also be constitutionally impermissible to 
distort this inquiry by breaking it down into singular components 
for the jury to find something such as, “did the defendant drive 
seventy miles per hour?,” and then have the judge decide whether 
driving at that speed constitutes culpable negligence.  This violates 
the jury right. 
 
 178. See supra note 167. 
 179. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The jury right actually predates the U.S. 
Constitution.  Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal 
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870 (1994).  The right to a jury was 
the only individual right enumerated in every constitution of the first twelve states, 
and, in 1774, the First Continental Congress’s Declaration of Rights announced the 
right to jury trial.  Id. 
 180. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role 
in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 46 (2003) (describing the 
critical check on state power and how a criminal jury fulfills that purpose). 
 181. 50A C.J.S. Juries § 246 (2008). 
 182.  
The right to criminal jury trial includes, as its most important element, 
the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite 
finding of “guilty.” [ ] The accused has the right to a jury determination 
on every element of the crime charged, and every material factual matter 
presented by the evidence.  None of the elements of the crime may be 
withheld from the jury and decided by the judge as a matter of law. 
Id. § 242. 
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Apprendi-Blakely case law affirmed that sentencing factors, to 
the extent that they increase a penalty above the statutory 
maximum, must be treated just like elements.  To hand over any of 
these elements or guilt determinations to the judge is an invalid 
procedure under the law.183 
This theory—that sentencing factors are “elements”—has been 
termed the “elements rule” by University of Pennsylvania Law 
Professor Stephanos Bibas184 and garners support from many legal 
scholars.185 “The elements rule holds that any fact that increases a 
defendant’s statutory maximum sentence must be an element of 
the offense.  These facts must therefore be charged in an 
indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”186 
Apprendi and its progeny add authoritative punch to scholarly 
arguments favoring treating of sentencing factors as elements.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court overtly adopted the “elements rule” when it 
held that “‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum,’ whether the statute calls it an element or a sentencing factor, 
 
 183. See id. 
 184. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World 
of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1099 (2001) (proposing the “elements rule”).  
Professor Bibas’s extensive bibliography on criminal sentencing and criminal 
justice is available online.  Penn Law Faculty: Stephanos Bibas, PENN LAW, 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/sbibas/ (last visited June 1, 2011).  
Incidentally, Professor Bibas testified to the U. S. Sentencing Commission on the 
future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines after Blakely.  Id. 
 185. See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1467, 1469 (2001) (supporting Apprendi elements rule); Mark D. Knoll & 
Richard G. Singer, Searching for the “Tail of the Dog”: Finding “Elements” of Crimes in 
the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1112, 1118 
(1999) (supporting the elements rule and critical of McMillan); Colleen P. 
Murphy, Jury Factfinding of Offense-Related Sentencing Factors, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 41 
(1992) (proposing juries find all enhancement facts regardless of whether they are 
named sentencing factors in statute); Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a “Crime” 
the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations 
on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather Than Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 297 (1998) (promoting the elements rule); Benjamin J. 
Preister, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, the Offense of Conviction, and the Limited 
Role of Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 875–76 (2004) (supporting Apprendi’s 
requirement that factors be proven by jury); Richard G. Singer & Mark D. Knoll, 
Elements and Sentencing Factors: A Reassessment of the Alleged Distinction, 12 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 203, 206 (2000)(supporting the elements rule).  Contra, e.g., Jacqueline E. 
Ross, Unanticipated Consequences of Turning Sentencing Factors Into Offense Elements: 
The Apprendi Debate, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 197, 198–202 (2000) (arguing the 
elements rule will produce negative effects for criminal justice system). 
 186. Bibas, supra note 184, at 1099.  
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‘must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”187  The Court did so by reason of preserving constitutional 
protections for the criminal defendant.188 
“[Sir] William Blackstone warned that we must protect the 
criminal jury not from ‘open attacks,’ but from ‘secret 
machinations’ that on their face seem convenient and benign.”189  
Rourke creates a convenient end-run around the basic constitutional 
and judicial provisions dictating that sentencing factors, to the 
extent they increase penalties beyond the statutory maximum, are 
elements that juries should determine.  It may be that Rourke 
comprises the quiet, perhaps unintended, attack on the jury’s 
central role in the administration of criminal justice against which 
Blackstone cautioned.190 
D. Counter-Argument: A Policy Argument for Fact-Factor Bifurcation 
Notwithstanding the incompatibility of Rourke and the 
“elements rule,” sound policy arguments favor the Rourke fact-factor 
procedure.191  However, in the end, the author maintains that 
policy cannot trump precedent.  It is impermissible to advance a 
desired result at the cost of the constitutional right to have juries 
determine criminal elements.192 
Nonetheless, many rightly believe that judges are simply better 
at addressing sentencing questions than juries.193  A major criticism 
of Apprendi-Blakely, and one shared by Justice Breyer,194 “has been 
 
 187. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 550 (2002) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 188. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477. 
 189. Barkow, supra note 180, at 34 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 350 (1769)). 
 190. Id. at 84. 
 191. Interestingly, the Rourke court did not posit any policy rationale 
motivating its decision.  Rather, the court, as the author has argued, devised a fact-
factor distinction and insisted that Blakely allows for it.  However, it must be noted 
that Blakely is silent as to such a practice, and Apprendi expressly prohibits the 
procedure.  See supra note 186 and accompanying text.  It is this author’s position, 
however, that the Rourke court was likely motivated by unspoken policy interests.  
The rest of this section explicates those potential motivating factors.  See infra 
notes 195–207. 
 192. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t is not arguable 
that, just because one thinks it is a better system [to have a judge decide facts that 
determine the length of sentence], it must be, or is even more likely to be, the 
system envisioned by a Constitution that guarantees trial by jury.”). 
 193. See infra notes 194–197 and accompanying text. 
 194. Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 254–55 (2005) (discussing in 
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that juries are just not very good at the kinds of complex inquires 
that sentencing under modern guidelines schemes requires.”195  
Some commentators express concern that jurors do not have the 
capacity to analyze the often open-ended, simultaneously 
qualitative and quantitative, non-binary questions that are typical at 
the sentencing stage.196  Others recognize the critical function of 
the jury as a “check” on prosecutorial allegations during trial, but 
posit that judges are better suited to bring the “reasoned” 
judgment that is needed at the sentencing stage.197 
Take particular cruelty, for example.  One need only begin to 
contemplate how a juror is to determine whether a given violent 
crime was committed in a particularly cruel way—one that 
sufficiently exceeds the threshold of how others typically commit 
it—to see how complicated this question might be.198  Arguably, for 
average citizens, much assaultive or violent conduct may be 
deemed a priori particularly cruel.199  Perhaps it is more prudent to 
allow a judge to decide as a matter of experience, a posteriori, the 
point at which a harsher sentence is warranted.200 
 
 
 
dictum a hypothetical securities fraud situation in which related sentencing statute 
is so complex it would be very difficult for a jury to be instructed on the “loss” 
element). 
 195. J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the 
Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 303 (2006) (assessing the performance 
of juries in finding sentencing facts). 
 196. Id. at 301–03 (noting that entrusting jurors with such difficult sentencing-
related fact questions can lead to cognitive overload, frustration, loss of 
motivation, difficulties in evaluating evidence, and deliberation-related biases). 
 197. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 41, 55 (2006) (arguing that juries are effective at trial, but 
lack the judgment, flexibility, and experience that sentencing demands). 
 198. However, we often ask jurors to take on complex, non-binary inquires.  
Culpable negligence, intent, and pre-meditation are common examples of vague, 
difficult concepts that, nonetheless, must be determined by a jury to comport with 
our constitutional standards. 
 199. See Interview with Bradford Colbert, supra note 160 (pointing out that 
most jurors in a murder trial are likely to find the murder “particularly cruel” and 
explaining that, for that reason, a judge is better positioned to make the final 
determination as to whether aggravating factors are present). 
 200. Particular cruelty very well may be a decision that should be made by a 
judge because a judge is an experienced “repeat player” in sentencing, and jurors 
simply are not.  Accordingly, a judge over his or her time on the bench will see 
many first-degree assaults.  A jury only sees one.  See Berman & Bibas, supra note 
197, at 37, 55 (characterizing judges as “repeat players” and detailing why 
sentencing requires their “expert” decisionmaking). 
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The “elements rule” has also come under attack as harmful to 
defendants for undermining, rather than bolstering, the right to a 
jury.201  Because the “elements rule” requires that any fact that 
could trigger an enhanced sentence must be charged in the 
complaint or indictment,202 defendants are forced to give up 
important sentencing issues if they plead guilty—they effectively 
waive them.203  Conversely, in going to trial, defendants are 
subjected to an increased potential for prejudice when aggravating-
factor issues are raised and corresponding evidence is presented 
before a jury.204 
The foregoing policy arguments cut against Apprendi-Blakely 
and favor Rourke-like fact-factor bifurcation, in which sentencing 
“facts” are decided by a jury, yet the determination of whether 
those facts comprise an aggravating “factor” lies with the judge.  
Rourke seems to offer a sensible approach that inherently 
recognizes limitations of jury capacity and other fairness concerns.  
Yet, while there are compelling reasons to take aggravating 
sentencing factor inquires out of the realm of the jury and entrust 
them to the judge, as is prescribed in Rourke, our law205 has made it 
clear this practice is simply impermissible.206 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are legitimate arguments that Blakely may undermine 
modern sentencing reform’s goals of uniformity and fairness in 
criminal penalties.  And while the Rourke court did not posit any 
policy rationale for its decision, it is clear there are compelling 
 
 201. See Bibas, supra note 184, at 1100 (arguing several ways in which treating 
sentencing factors as elements—ones that must be charged in the indictment—
undermines the right to a jury); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 329 
(2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (foreshadowing that the jury right, which Blakely 
purports to support, will actually be threatened by the rule). 
 202. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Bibas, supra note 184, at 1100 (“[T]he elements rule in effect deprives 
many defendants of sentencing hearings, the only hearings they were likely to 
have.  By making important factual disputes elements of crimes, it forces 
defendants to surrender sentencing issues . . . when they plead guilty.”). 
 204. See id. at 1143. 
 205. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310 (reaffirming Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
490 (2000)). 
 206. See supra Part IV.C. for a discussion of the constitutional jury right as 
encompassing the right to have a jury decide all elements of an offense and 
related aggravating sentencing factors to the extent that they may trigger an 
enhanced sentence. 
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interests advanced by Rourke’s bifurcated fact-factor procedure, 
which implicitly rules that aggravating sentencing factors are not 
elements of an offense for jury determination.207 Whether Rourke is 
“right” or “wrong” is unanswered, and may not be the most 
important question to ask of the case.  More significantly, Rourke is 
emblematic of the very real, inescapable tension between 
constitutional precedent and prudential policy with respect to the 
role of criminal juries.  Rourke should be understood as a signal that 
guidelines-sentencing states are experiencing undesirable 
limitations, perhaps both procedural and substantive, flowing from 
Blakely’s requirements. 
However, it is not the role of state courts, like Minnesota’s, to 
bend the rule announced in Blakely through “secret machinations” 
to promote desirable policies.  It is emphatically the duty of the 
U.S. Supreme Court to say what the law is with respect to the U.S. 
Constitution.208  Accordingly, the Supreme Court decides what the 
constitutional jury right does and does not entail.209  Thus, it is up 
to the Supreme Court alone to overturn or modify its Apprendi-
Blakely “elements doctrine” to make way for Rourke. 
From a practical point of view, this change cannot happen 
until the purported damaging effects of Blakely are shown to be 
systematic and the rule too rigid.  This will not just take time, but 
will also require a Supreme Court that is willing to allow 
contemporary considerations of policy and justice to inform its 
understanding of the parameters of the jury function.  If this 
happens, the element/sentencing factor pendulum may swing away 
from the formalism of Blakely and toward a practical Rourke-like 
sentencing procedure.  However, as it stands now, Minnesota’s new 
fact-factor bifurcation in aggravated sentencing deliberations 
creates an impermissible end-run around the law. 
 
 
 207. State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 920–21 (2009). 
 208. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 209. See id. (“Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the courts 
must decide on the operation of each.”). 
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